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Abstract 
Meter tampering is defined as a fraudulent manipulation which implies a service that is not billed by a utility company. It is a 
lack of consumption control for the utility company and a main problem because they represent an important loss of income. We 
have developed a methodology consists of a set of three algorithms for the detection of meter tampering in the Emasesa 
Company (a water distribution company in Seville and one of the most important of the country). The algorithms were generated 
and programmed after a data mining process from the database of the company and they detect three type of consumption 
patterns: Progressive drops, sudden drops and abnormally low consumption. The methodology has been tested with in situ 
inspections of the customers of a village of the province of Seville. Once carried out the inspections by the utility, the inspectors 
confirmed a good success rate taking into account that the detection of this type of fraud is very difficult because it is a non-
invasive technique. Besides, this type of detections is a topic that, if we take a look at the state of the art, there are few references 
or works. 
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1. Introduction 
Water is one of the most important resources of the world and, therefore, a water utility is one of the most 
important utilities because water is both essential for the survival of the human race and can act as an important 
energy resource. Governments invest a great quantity of money to ensure the distribution of potable water to the 
inhabitants of cities and towns; as a result, it is very important to establish a good infrastructure for water 
distribution, from the place in which it is stored and/or gathered to houses. This infrastructure is very expensive and, 
in some places, it is necessary to establish some means to control the consumption. 
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Meter tampering is defined as a fraudulent manipulation which implies a service that is not billed by a utility 
company.  This type of losses represents a lack of consumption control for the utility company, as it does not allow 
for registering of the customer’s consumption as well as a proper billing of the service [1]. Although the losses 
provoked by meter tampering are a major source of loss,  the losses can be also due to leaks, meter malfunction or 
illegal water connection. 
The utilities usually install a meter that registers the consumption of the customer in each house or place where 
the water needs exist. Thus, the utilization of new meter infrastructure, databases and information systems has 
provided the perfect scenario for the application of data mining and computational intelligence in the analysis of 
consumers’ consumption for detection of meter tampering. Currently, some older water meters are in use, which are 
more vulnerable to different types of fraud or illegal manipulation. In addition, the new technologies related to smart 
grids [2], [3] will provide additional information, which will increase the amount of information regarding the 
consumption of customers. 
Aided by the experience in power utilities [4][5], our research group has been working for the whole of 2013 and 
part of 2014 on the detection of meter tampering in water distribution. Thus, as a result of our work, a methodology 
for fraud detection in water consumption generated from a data mining process is proposed in this article. The 
methodology is composed of several algorithms based on the detection of customers with suspect drops in their 
consumption and abnormally low consumption. Besides, we have added a module of geographical location for the 
customers detected. 
If we take a look at the state of the art, there are relatively few references regarding detection of meter tampering 
using data mining of the water distribution data. Thus, [6] proposed the utilization of remote systems to increase the 
control in the distribution network and to model the behaviour of the network from the demand and losses 
viewpoint; thus, the author used pressure and flow sensors. The proposed solution is applied in a real case in a water 
distribution network in Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina). In general, several references exist that are 
dedicated to water demand modelling, a good example of which is the model proposed by [7] in which the author 
describes a model of the different consumption levels (residential and non-residential) and the losses model, which 
includes well-defined examples and categories supported by statistical data from several countries. On the other 
hand, [8] proposed an application for fraud detection in water distribution based on a Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition (SCADA), which uses a data-driven Decision Support System (DSS), applying a water flow active 
control in the water distribution network.  
2. Meter Tampering in Seville (Spain) 
We worked with the Emasesa Company (Empresa Metropolitana de Abastecimiento y Saneamiento de Aguas de 
Sevilla), which is the most important water distribution company in Seville and one of the most important companies 
in Spain.  
The problem of meter tampering in water distribution is a well-known fact to all companies in this sector. Thus, 
sometimes, this illegal manipulation of the meters can be applied in a very short period of time. There are various 
fraudulent methods as carrying out a direct connection, removing or bypassing the meter. But the main way that the 
customers have for the illegal manipulation occurs because the older water meters are based on an oscillating piston 
or disk, which relies on the water to physically displace the moving measuring element in direct proportion to the 
amount of water that passes through the meter. The piston or disk moves a magnet that drives the register. This type 
of meter can be manipulated using an external strong magnet to slow down and, even, stop the magnet that drives the 
register. The detection of this type of fraud is very difficult because it is a non-invasive technique.  
Currently, there are additional modules for old meters to avoid this type of fraud based on the common magnets. 
They include a new fraud detection system based on the detection of magnetic fields. Thus, if the register detects 
one, it will enable an alarm. The thing is that the implantation of such modules is very expensive, and sometimes, the 
installation of a smart meter is cheaper than the installation of the methods to avoid the magnet fraud. Thus, Emasesa 
Company is progressively implementing this type of smart meters in homes, but it is an expensive process and even 
most customers have the older meters. 
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Thus, Emasesa Company, with the old meters, registers quarterly the consumption of the residential water meters; 
however, for other supplies with greater consumption or for locations with smart meters, the consumption is 
registered more often. The proposed work was applied to consumers with quarterly reports.   
There are several consumption patterns regarding meter tampering (including magnet fraud, removing the meter 
or bypassing the meter) and it was necessary to use several algorithms to identify these types of pattern.  
Although the results for the case study of this paper is on a village in particular, for the development and 
programming of the algorithms we worked with the entire database of the customers of the Emasesa Company. This 
database covers the Seville customers and a group of villages, representing a total number of 357,920 clients (of 
which 197,513 were from Seville capital and the rest from villages). From all of those customers, first, we filtered 
the clients those contracts are relative to points relating to irrigation supplies, churches, public institutions, etc. 
(because such clients are unlikely to be committing fraud).  
3. Methodology for Detection 
The methodology is composed of three algorithms based on the detection of customers with the following 
incidences:  
 
- Progressive drops in their consumption. 
- Sudden drops in their consumption. 
- Abnormally low consumption. 
3.1. Progressive drops in their consumption 
An obvious symptom of abnormal consumption for a customer (and thus a means to detect meter tampering) is a 
decrease in consumption. This type of decrease may be due to an actual decrease in consumption (e.g., due to a 
change in the number of people living in a home), equipment failure, or voluntary manipulation of the measuring 
equipment (fraud). 
To detect decreased consumption due to fraud, we developed and applied two algorithms to detect consumption 
decreases. The algorithms that we programmed use as input data the following data from each customer:  
 
- The last 24 reading values, which involve historical data of the last 6 years of consumption.  
- The number of people per household.  
 
As a first step for both algorithms, a normalization process was programmed and applied to all of the customers. 
The process divided each of the readings by the number of people registered in the supply point; subsequently, the 
value obtained was scaled between 0 and 1. Thus, a more reliable study of water consumption (water consumed per 
capita) was obtained using this normalized indicator. 
In the first algorithm, the aim was to detect customers with progressive decreases in their water consumption, 
whose pattern could be due to a progressive increase in fraudulent conduct by the user. The basis of this algorithm is 
the Pearson correlation coefficient. In statistics, the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) is a measure that weights the 
degree of linear correlation between two variables X and Y. In this case, X is the time parameter (number of 
readings) and Y is the normalized consumption of the customer. 
This coefficient is calculated using the following equation:  
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The result of the calculation of this parameter is a numerical value ranging from -1 to 1. Interpretation of this 
ratio is shown in Fig. 1. As observed in the above figure, the value of r approaches +1 when the correlation is 
positive (thus, higher values mean higher X-values) and the values approach -1 when the correlation is negative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Interpretation of the coefficient Pearson 
We applied this algorithm to the entire sample set and obtained quite high numbers of customers with negative r 
values. The resulting histogram for negative values of r for the subsample relative to the city of Seville, with a total 
number of 35,147 customers analyzed, is shown in the following figure (Fig. 2): 
 
 
Fig. 2. Histogram of the Pearson coefficient for customers of Seville 
As we see there was a majority of users had negative correlation (and therefore its water consumption decreased 
over time). In particular there was a 70% proportion of customers with negative correlation (24,585 customers), 
compared to 30% with positive correlation (10.562 customers). Besides, we observed that it was possible to set a 
high number of customers with strong (and some almost perfect) negative correlation. As a result, for the subsample 
relative to the city of Seville of 35,147 customers, 3,598 customers were found with an R value below -0.6 (which 
accounted for approximately 10%), 1,827 had a value of r below -0.7 (which corresponds to approximately 5%) and 
626 had a value of r below -0.8 (approximately 2%).   
Negative correlation 
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Thus, once seen the previous ranges, we could select the customers to be inspected for the company with a range 
of negative correlations with a value below -0.6 or below -0.8 depending on the number of customers to be 
inspected by the company.  
Let us consider an example of a real case of a customer of the sample set. The pattern of the following figure 
(Fig. 3) corresponds to the evolution of the normalized consumption of the example customer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of customer detected with the first algorithm 
3.2. Sudden drops in their consumption 
The detection of those customers whose consumption had stabilized after an initial drop in consumption is also of 
interest. Because such clients could not be fully detected using this first algorithm, we developed a second algorithm 
based on an analysis of windows. 
Specifically, we programmed an algorithm that is based on an analysis of the normalized consumption of 6 
windows for the 24 reading values of the customer (therefore, four reading values in each window, or equivalently, 
one year’s time in each window). 
The search pattern and the representation of windows taken are shown in Fig. 4. The goal, therefore, was to 
detect a high and constant consumption in one or more of the initial windows, followed by a sudden drop, and 
finally a low and stable normalized consumption in the latest consumption values. 
Two configurable parameters must be configured in this algorithm to detect the sudden decrease between two 
windows:  
 
-  The percentage of decrease in consumption of one window with respect to the other one (Desc). 
-  The vertical width of the windows of the analysis or, equivalently, the limit on the deviation of the average 
consumption of each of the windows (Desv). 
 
Specifically, the detections was based on the calculation for the 6 windows of maximum (Max), minimum (Min), 
median (Median) and mean (Mean) of the values of their normalized consumption. In turn, these window parameters 
(Max, Min, Median and Mean) were compared with the two previously described configurable parameters (Desc 
and Desv).  
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Fig. 4. Pattern of drop consumption 
After a data mining process we generated a set of rules. These rules were tested with the sample of Seville 
Capital and, at the same time, validated by the Emasesa Company (for example, they suggested us the appropriate 
percentage of decrease in consumption to be detected by the rules). The rules applied were the following ones (the 
suffix _X of each variable identifies the number of the window that mentions the value): 
 
((Max_6 < (Median_6 *Desv) and Min_6 > (Median_6 /Desv) and (Max_5 < (Median_5 *Desv) and Min_5 
> (Median_5 /Desv) and Mean_6 < Mean_5 / Desc)) 
or 
(Max_6 < (Median_6 *Desv) and Min_6 > (Median_6 /Desv) and (Max_5 < (Median_5 *Desv) and Min_5 
> (Median_5 /Desv) and (Max_4 < (Median_4 *Desv) and Min_4 > (Median_4 /Desv) and  Mean_6 < 
Mean_4 / Desc) and Mean_5 < Mean_4 / Desc)) 
or 
(Max_6 < (Median_6 *Desv) and Min_6 > (Median_6 /Desv) and (Max_5 < (Median_5 *Desv) and Min_5 
> (Median_5 /Desv) and (Max_4 < (Median_4 *Desv) and Min_4 > (Median_4 /Desv) and (Max_3 < 
(Median_3 *Desv) and Min_3 > (Median_3 /Desv) and Mean_6 < Mean_3 / Desc) and Mean_5 < Mean_3 / 
Desc) and Mean_4 < Mean_3 / Desc)) 
) 
and  
Min_3>0 and Min_4>0 and Min_5>0 and Min_6>0 
 
Setting the parameters Desc and Desv with a value of 2 in both parameters, we covered 1,548 from 35,147 
customers analyzed for Sevilla Capital (a rate of approximately 4.5%) or 3,581 with a Desc value of 1.5 (a rate of 
approximately 10%).  
In the next figure (Fig. 5), it is possible observe the pattern of a customer detected using the second algorithm for 
the sample of Seville Capital. 
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Fig. 5. Example of customer detected with the second algorithm 
3.3. Abnormally low consumption 
Experts from companies that supply water have estimated a minimum amount of daily water consumption per 
capita. For Emasesa Company, this minimum value is approximately 114 to 116 litters of water per person per day. 
This amount is equivalent to a minimum annual consumption of approximately 41 m3 per person (114 
litters*person*day extrapolated to 30 days per month and 12 months per year).  Although the consumption of water 
can be very uneven and dependent on multiple factors (closed homes, change of business, spending habits, used 
appliances, the use of irrigation) and, as previously stated, a low consumption does not necessarily correspond to a 
meter tampering case or some type of measurement equipment failure, this number (114 to 116 litters of water per 
person and day) was reached after years of experience of the company, and therefore, it was a very relevant data 
point to be used in the detections.  
Thus, we generated an algorithm based on a rule that covered customers with annual consumption values of less 
than 10 m3 in the last year (calculated as the sum of the last four quarterly reading values). This threshold value (10 
m3 in the last year) was set after discussions with the company and based on the statistical research of frauds 
detected in the past.  For the calculation of the number of people per household, we used the information collected 
by the company on the population census and the information registered by the customer in the company (not 
always consistent).  
Once configured, applying the algorithm to the subsample corresponding to Seville Capital resulted in the 
detection of a ratio of approximately 5% of households, which meant a total number of 1,653 customers from the 
35,147 customers analyzed. 
4. Results and Conclusions 
After performing some initial tests, we performed the first actual execution of the algorithms, with the objective 
that the Emasesa Company sends inspectors to investigate a set of clients. Emasesa Company selected for this first 
test of the algorithms a small sample of customers of a village of Seville Province. Thus, the number total of 
customers of this village used as inputs in the algorithms after the previous filters was 859.  
In regard to the configuration parameters of the algorithms: For the first algorithm, we selected the customers to 
be inspected for the company with a correlation value below -0.8 and also with a number of real readings greater 
than 10 during the 6 years of the analysis. This second filter was applied to avoid negative correlations, and 
therefore fraud detections, relative to consumption estimates for the company due that it is common practice for the 
company when they cannot access to the measuring device of the customer to perform an estimation of the 
consumption. By other hand, for the second algorithm, we set the parameters Desc and Desv with a value of 2 in 
both parameters.  
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We were covering about 4% customers with each of the two algorithms. Thus, from this subsample and with this 
configuration, the algorithms marked 85 customers as possible fraudulent customers. From those 85 customers, after 
completing the inspections, the total number of fraudulent customers detected by Emasesa Company with the use of 
the algorithms was 6. The data obtained with the algorithms correspond to a success rate of approximately 7%.  
When inspectors went to their home and asked customers for their consumption drop, the main reason why they 
justified their drop was the death of a family member. This problem was difficult to control and ascertain by 
Emasesa Company because the update of the number of people in a household was a data that Emasesa Company 
received updated once a year.  
On the other hand, although this result might appear to be low, these results are good for Emasesa Company 
conditioned by two facts: 
 
- To date, Emasesa Company in its inspections swept an entire geographical area without making any 
processing for the selection of customers. Thus, it implies a poor success rate. In addition to improving this 
success rate, these algorithms could also save hours of inspection to the company. 
- The ease of the customers to remove the magnet from the measuring equipment, which reduces the 
probability that the user is surprised while performing the fraud. 
- The algorithms indicated that the analyzed area corresponding to the particular village was not a 
particularly fraudulent area. 
 
The conclusions obtained after performing the work and the analyzing the results achieved by the inspections are 
as follows: 
 
- The fraud in this type of business leaves no sign of manipulation, making it quite difficult to detect frauds 
via inspection. During working hours, fraudulent customers usually remain vigilant because an inspector 
can detect fraud by surprise.  Thus, the inspections by Emasesa Company were performed during non-
business hours (usually, early in the morning) in order that the customers were not located in the business 
premises and they could remove the magnet.  
- The algorithms developed detect approximately 7% of the meter tampering. The obtained model provided 
the Emasesa Company with good support to identify different patterns of customers. 
- Having a higher frequency of reading values (currently, four for each year) significantly improves the 
results. This is due to that sometimes the effect of this manipulation is imperceptible in water meters read 
quarterly in which detecting drops of consumption is not possible. 
- The main solution to improve the results, which today is investing Emasesa Compan, is the installation of 
smart meters. This type of meters has got two advantages: On the one hand, they are not affected by 
magnets and, on the other hand, they provide measurement time interval of an hour (And therefore, better 
resolution for the algorithms). 
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